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INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant, Don Brokmeyer, relies on his opening brief and refers
this Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, standards of
review, cases and facts. Mr. Brokmeyer respond\> iu ihw .Slate 'i .nir, IV--I in his
opening brief as follows:
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is well established that the smell of burnt marijuana would justify trie
warrantless search of a vehicle. How-'v-'i T ,"J< • k s.tfeguarJ'institutional
righto. II IK requirement fhat the officer's smell be corroborated has been imposed.
See. State v. Maycock. 947 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In the case at
hand, the deputies initial justification for the search and subsequent an est Ir.i

1

possession of psilocybin was based solely on the presence of the marijuana
seeds. That observation should have been corroborated. To allow an officer to
change that testimony and escape corroboration requirement sabotages the
constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizures.
ARGUMENT
THE LACK OF CORROBORATION OF THE MARIJUANA SEEDS
UNDERMINES THE LATER JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SEARCH.
(Reply to Points A & B)

In the case at hand, Deputy Begay's initial justification for expanding the
scope of the stop was based solely on the presence of marijuana seeds on the
floorboard. [R. 28: 35]. Ignoring the seeds, Deputy Begay simply asked if there
were drugs in the vehicle. [R. 28: 54]. Mr. Brokmeyer admitted possessing the
illegal mushrooms, which was the basis of his arrest. [R. 28: 16].
When the deputy testified, he justified the stop on the presence of the
marijuana seeds and a portion of the illicit mushroom in the ashtray. [R. 28: 35].
Although the trial court expressed its concern about the deputy's inability to
describe marijuana, it summarily dismissed any concern that the presence of the
mushroom in the ashtray had not been mentioned in the initial report. [R. 28: 70].
The trial court simply stated that it was confident that the deputy saw the
mushrooms. [R.28: 70].

2

Under these circumstances-where the existence of marijuana seeds was
in question and where the justification for the search changed only after being
challenged, the trial court should have required corroboration. To hold otherwise
would defeat the purposes of Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and its progeny which require a search to be justified at its
inception. Indeed, the trial court allowed a corroboration requirement to be
entirely circumvented.
That corroboration was necessary was also based on the deputy's inability
to describe the psilocybin, even after he had, in fact, seized that substance. The
Appellee dismisses any concern about this and simply refers to the trial court's
statement that, "if he's a member of the human race, he knows what mushrooms look
like." [Appellee's Brief, p. 9]. That Deputy Begay responded affirmatively to the
prosecutor's question of whether a mushroom had an "umbrella-looking top of a
mushroom kind of adds little. [Appellee's Brief, p. 9].

Finally, that the deputy testified

that an illicit mushroom was "kind of smashed up, inside a ziplock bag' or in a dried
condition adds nothing. [Appellee's Brief, p. 9]. Brokmeyer admitted that the substance
in the baggie was illicit mushrooms. [R. 28:17, 40].1
In the case at hand, Deputy Begay could not describe marijuana. Yet, the
presence of marijuana seeds is what his warrantless search of Mr. Brokmeyer's
vehicle was based upon.

Deputy Begay testified that marijuana was an illicit

'The mushroom in the ashtray was not in a baggie. [R. 28:50].
3

substance, but he allowed the driver to continue on her way with this illicit
substance and did not charge either occupant for possessing that substance.
That this matter was summarily dismissed by the trial court in its statement that,
"the whole story that leads up to [the reasonable cause to believe the defendant
committed an offense] is completely irrelevant" is troubling. [R: 28: 70]. Looking
at all of the circumstances certainly brings forth questions about the deputies
justification for searching. The trial court's reasoning borders on justifying the
search based on what was ultimately seized. Such a reasoning cannot be
reconciled with the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and
seizure.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court
reverse the trial court's denial of the Defendant's suppression motion.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2OO0^~)
RSALIE REII)LY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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